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Sedimented Forms: Coming Back to Autonomy  
 
What does it mean either to affirm or deny that art is a commodity “like any other”? And why is this an 
ontological problem for art in a way it is not for any other commodity? Though not perhaps wholly 
unpredictable as a phenomenon given the resurgence of Marxist inquiries in the academy since at least 
the global financial crisis, though that 
momentum had been building since the 
turn of the century with Negri and 
Hardt’s Empire, recent years have seen 
several approaches to these questions. 
They have taken the form of disproving 
art’s commodity status vis-à-vis the 
stipulations of neoclassical economics 
and Marxist theory alike (Beech), the 
downgrading of artistic autonomy as an 
interesting problem in the age of the 
“creative” and their “industries” 
(Brouillette), the tracing of a tangled dialectic of political and artistic autonomy on its way to somewhere 
else (Stakemeier and Vishmidt) and finally, a number of sorties into the related problem of abstraction 
as a political-economic and conceptual condition for contemporary art (Lütticken; Ngai; Moreno). 
Theodor W. Adorno and Peter Burger can be seen as anchoring some of these more recent contributions 
as they chart the relationship between the modern principle of artistic autonomy and its historical 
vicissitudes.  
The volume under review can be said to depart from these projects in a number of significant ways. 
The difference in the path Brown takes can be seen immediately in the type of object he engages, which 
is generically promiscuous, encompassing the proverbial “culture industry” rather than a demarcated 
field of visual art, or the literary arts, in the case of Brouillette or Ngai above. In this, he is taking a cue 
in spirit if not in method from Adorno’s autonomy thesis, which is often applied to parse modernist 
painting whereas it was actually concerned with modernist music and literary texts. If only to invert the 
spirit, however, because the generic promiscuity signals a bid that the “culture industry”/”art” dichotomy 
can be overcome if “autonomy” designates only the internal coherence of the object rather than its 
position in the market or the type of labor used to produce it. The autonomous artwork may be located 
in the market, but its autonomy is not determined by it, negatively or affirmatively. For Adorno, the 
market existence of an artwork was extraneous; it always came second, analytically speaking. For 
Brown, it is simply an unavoidable parameter, forming its condition of legibility as an artwork; thus, 
institutional definitions cease to have traction. This is why Brown can pursue an inquiry wholly indebted 
to Adorno, Kant and Hegel and discuss figures such as Ben Lerner, The Wire, and the White Stripes, a 
trajectory he has been working on for several years through essays published in nonsite journal and 
elsewhere. As with those philosophies of the aesthetic, for Brown the stakes of autonomy as a social 
ontology of art lies nearly exclusively on the side of reception, not production; or, perhaps more to the 
point, in the nature of the artwork that mediates reception and production. Thus the book juxtaposes 
one form of immanence with another: the historically unprecedented immanence of the market to 
artworks may be confronted or suspended when works succeed in realizing an immanent purposiveness, 
and thereby make their claims to aesthetic autonomy. One of the primary vehicles for this claim, in 
Brown’s account, is genre, and the significant discussion on this is found in the chapters cited above. 
Brown may not be talking about visual art as his referent for “art,” but this is not only to demonstrate 
that autonomy can extend to artefacts of popular culture, but so can the category of “art,” underlining 
Bürger’s thesis that art and autonomy in modernity are different names for the same thing (Bürger). 
Autonomy is the ideological (de-historicized and essentialized) social fact of an exemption from the 
relations of capitalist production. Precisely because it is a social fact, or, more strongly, a social ontology, 
it cannot be transcended ethically, strategically or through any variant of “critical practice.” This is a 
state of affairs whose disavowal has become consensual in contemporary art. But if the modernist 
commitment to autonomy is revealed as aesthetic ideology, i.e. an imaginary relationship to the real 
conditions of existence, that does not bring a contemporary commitment to heteronomy any closer to 
truth. Like modernist autonomy, it is a productive ideology, with autonomy ever ritually slain by those 
constituencies of the institution of art that are committed to extending art’s capacities beyond its walls, 
or re-situating it as yet another managerial ”competence” useful in any manner of predicaments. In this 
Can an object be autonomous when autonomy as 
a disposition or a relation becomes unavailable to 
its viewers? It could be argued that if there is no 
space left for an autonomy of the subject, the 
autonomy of the object becomes something akin to 
a Zen koan. The internal, unemphatic other to 
capitalist values becomes a talisman of another 
civilization or spacetime, not ours. 
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regard, it is to be noted that the emphasis on experience and interaction in art that tends towards “social 
practice” as well as the spectacle economy of “mirror rooms” and ice cream museums, as has been 
critiqued by Claire Bishop and others in recent years, is taken up by Brown as an equation of experience 
with the heteronomy of the market, with “external contingent compulsion” rather than internally 
generated meaning, a meaning which is excess to the medium or the institutions that condition it. 
For Brown, conversely, the designation of art/autonomy is along the axis of intention and internal 
coherence; it is an evaluative, or at best, structural and relational term rather than an institutional 
category. That means he is concerned with the “field of cultural production” as a whole when he talks 
about the art field, hence he can talk about “subfields”, such as music, in the book, while still calibrating 
their degree of subsumption at the level of the work, which is how we are able to measure if a work falls 
into the category of art or culture industry. Internal coherence is key to the analysis, because if it is not 
present, the arbiter of the work’s composition is anticipated consumer desire, or, the demands of the 
market rather than immanent ends. Since determination by immanent ends is, after all, the simple 
definition of “autonomy,” it seems to be logical to conflate “autonomy” and “art” here. The argument is 
basically in accord with Adorno’s division between art and the culture industry, albeit doing without 
Adorno’s interest in the organization of the relations of production in the two spheres. 
The artwork as the “internal unemphatic other to capitalist society,” in one of the book’s most concise 
formulations, has to be situated in a present where the relationship between culture industry and 
institutional or “contemporary” art, a gulf with many bridges thrown over it even in the days of Aesthetic 
Theory, is now of a character that reflects the unparalleled dominance of market logics in every sphere 
of existence. For this reason, the arguments made by, e.g., Adorno and Burger, for the critical traction 
of the principle of aesthetic autonomy, still hold, albeit for different reasons. For Burger, the failure of 
the pre- and inter-war avant-garde movement was parodically reflected in the institutionalization of 
dissent and attempts at art/life dismantling in the neo-avant-garde of the 1960s and 70s. The avant-
garde failed in its initiative to overcome the social conditions of bourgeois society that hived off art to a 
passive condition of autonomy, failed to transform the whole of that society, in conjunction with 
revolutionary movements that also failed at this, and thus failed to sublate itself in the process. Yet art 
could still critically mobilize this separation, just like all other “autonomous” institutions of a functionally 
differentiated civil society, to stamp its critique in the public sphere. For Brown, it is rather the “success” 
of the avant-garde—which is nothing but the other side of Burger’s “failure”—at stamping its sensibility 
and methods on the offerings of the culture industry that has to be reckoned with. Further, there are 
no longer institutions whose relative autonomy lends them critical traction with respect to the 
administered whole, and there is no “organized social basis” which could mount a productive challenge 
to the financialized institutions that do exist. But this only exacerbates a situation that was arguably 
already the case in the era of the historical avant-gardes. Without a revolutionary impetus, the 
“heteronomization” of art, the attempt to overcome the division between art and life, would only ever 
result in more material for the culture industry or more assets for the financial markets, if life is always 
on course to merge with capitalist life, i.e. the market.  
Given this vision of a tendentially all-engulfing capitalist bios, a question could be posed about 
whether the proposition is primarily an empirical or a logical one. It could be noted here that, pace 
Michel Foucault, Rosa Luxemburg or Jason W. Moore, universal heteronomy to the market is implausible 
as a claim since market rule requires nonmarket actors and institutions, which it in turn menaces or 
adapts to its ends. This can be seen in both doctrinaire neoliberalism, with its more or less salient 
authoritarian sides, in Foucault’s story of both ordoliberalism and neoliberalism in the Birth of Biopolitics 
lectures, or in Luxemburg’s, Moore’s or social reproduction theory’s emphasis on the need for non-
commodified or non-valued “outsides” such as nature and gendered labor, to subsidize capitalist profit-
making. The principle that primitive accumulation is ongoing rather than an originary moment would 
not necessarily clash with Brown’s argument, with its emphasis on the constant saturation of more of 
the world by market logics. However, the omission of labor, or production processes in general, from 
his account of the social form of autonomy as a still-critical ontology of the artwork in the present, 
leaves the projection of autonomy exclusively onto the artwork looking like a one-sided pursuit, an issue 
which the above accounts can help cast in relief. I will return to this. 
One of the more fascinating turns in the argument is its foray into a value-form theory spin on the 
determination of the artwork’s autonomy as internal law vs. external demand. This is sketched out early 
on in the introduction although not developed elsewhere. Specifically, it is intended as the response to 
the question this review began with, in a paraphrase of the question of autonomy: why is the social 
ontology of art different from the social ontology of all other commodities? The Hegelian integration of 
the ontological and the dialectical is a template for inquiries in social ontology, so the recourse to value-
form theory makes sense here. The difference is surprisingly simple, and this is because it is an 
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illustration of the thesis using Marx’s circuits of c-m-c’ and m-c-m’. In the first, the commodity is an end 
in itself and its exchange is mediated by money; this corresponds to use-value in the circuit. In the 
second, the telos is money, mediated by the commodity, and this corresponds to exchange-value. The 
difference, however, is set out in affective terms: “What we have arrived at is an entity that embodies, 
and must seek to compel, conviction and an entity that seeks to provoke interest in its beholder—or, 
perhaps, all kinds of different interest from different beholders.” (Brown 6). Although the gulf here is 
seen to be an ontological one, the two circuits can also be seen, as they are in Marx, as different 
moments of the same process, or, as Brown puts it, the same process considered from different 
standpoints. Such dialectical agility shows the mediating hand of the “systematic dialectic” and the 
return to Hegel that has pervaded some corners of Anglophone Marxist theory since discussion and 
translation of the wertkritik publications started to emerge in roughly the past decade, a project that 
Brown has also been dedicated to (Brown, Larsen, Nilges and Robinson). 
The political implications of Brown’s account of the autonomy of art are both emphatic and elusive. 
Emphatic inasmuch as Brown is clear in his adherence to the politics of artistic autonomy as a necessary 
precondition to any emancipatory politics. Here there is a nod to the ethical universalism of Kant’s 
reflective judgment as staged by aesthetic experience—if there is no training of the sensibility in gaining 
a distance from things as they are, prompted by the internal coherence of, e.g., an artwork, how can 
the possibility of social change ever arise? Further, this is understood as a more radical position than 
the Schillerian aesthetics that attempted to politicize the contemplative limits of Kant’s position. 
Aesthetic education, in Schiller, can only exert a compensatory effect for the social barbarism of 
emergent commercial modernity; it cannot cultivate the critical distance enabling its overcoming in 
actuality. That is not what autonomy as a social ontology is intended to do. It is precisely as a vector 
towards emancipation on a political level that internal coherence as the commitment to internally 
generated laws is staked out as the core of the autonomy of the aesthetic. With this refusal of the 
pedagogical or the compensatory, autonomy’s critical intervention folds back on the gesture of 
autonomy as promissory, in Adorno’s sense of the term, that is, on the capacity to have or prefigure 
politics other than the shifting desires of the market. And maybe in our current conjuncture such an 
alignment of autonomy with negativity (a distinction Marcuse already drew in his writing on the 
affirmative character of art, that is, of autonomy) already takes us quite far, after the historical moment 
of autonomy as an ideology of the aesthetic and after the prospect of social autonomy beyond the 
market have both faded away. 
But if it takes us some distance, the question might then be how much mileage is left. Brown shows 
a salutary reticence in making dramatic claims for autonomy as coextensive with, rather than evocative 
of, any form of practical politics or ethics; inasmuch as autonomy gives us a view on non-identity, it is 
as foreign as can be to immediate use-values. The close readings that comprise the substantive part of 
the book are each persuasive exercises “reading for autonomy” as the tracking of internal coherence in 
art works, whether in the visual arts, novels, television series, or albums, with respect to their 
participation in the social, historical and formal conditions of their “genre.” The innovativeness of the 
approach, at heart is a classical one, is in the possibilities thrown up by bringing the autonomy thesis 
out from the hothouse of high modernist art into a much wider field and into the present. Autonomy is 
thus concerned to show there much life yet to be found in the approach. At the same time, there is a 
moment in the epilogue, which vies with the introduction in density and abundance of conceptual energy, 
where an opening towards a differently articulated notion of autonomy is made. This is the discussion 
of “purposiveness without purpose” as it reflects on Roberto Schwarz’s renowned essay on Kafka’s Cares 
of a Family Man (translated by Brown), and its uncanny homunculus, the spool-person Odradek. While 
the character may represent the impossible, phantom underside of the “bourgeois order,” what is more 
interesting, according to Brown, is its evacuation of the punitive structures of bourgeois order: “a 
lumpenproletariat without hunger and without fear of the police” (181). As such, the figure of Odradek 
is an analogue to the ‘internal, unemphatic other’ of the artwork, in its purposelessness and its vague 
menace to all right-thinking, but what if its excess, its negativity were to be followed as worklessness, 
as the negativity of labor? Neither the dimension of labor as internal negativity to capitalist valorization, 
nor the art-adjacent psychology of “human capital” formation, are broached in the version of autonomy 
as strictly artwork-immanent here. But neither the market immanence of the contemporary artwork in 
the cultural market nor its institutionally enabled internal coherence can really be grasped when neither 
producers or consumers—the subjects for such objects—come into the picture. Can an object be 
autonomous when autonomy as a disposition or a relation becomes unavailable to its viewers, to take 
up Brown’s contention that market saturation has now engulfed pretty much everything? As theorist 
Catherine Rottenberg notes, “Human beings are remade as specks of capital so that our relationship to 
ourselves and others becomes one of capital appreciation. Our relationships are perceived as forms of 
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capital that need to be invested wisely in order to enhance the self’s overall value” (Kale). It could be 
argued that if there is no space left for an autonomy of the subject, the autonomy of the object becomes 
something akin to a Zen koan. The internal, unemphatic other to capitalist values becomes a talisman 
of another civilization or spacetime, not ours. This also casts a baleful light on the division made in the 
book between the powerlessness of autonomy as politics and the powerlessness of political art. The 
dimension of autonomy as social ontology of art that can emerge through a consideration of the decay 
of the social autonomy of labor would also, conversely, allow us to sketch out the possibilities of 
autonomy as praxis, that is, how the ontology of art in capital is one of an autonomy that cannot be 
(narcissistically) dissolved in politics but rather enables, with its conceptual and economic resources, 
other and transversal ways of doing politics: the internal other doing an inside job. 
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